Genomic imprinting has been proposed to evolve when a gene's expression has ¢tness consequences for individuals with di¡erent coe¤cients of matrilineal and patrilineal relatedness, especially in the context of competition between o¡spring for maternal resources. Previous models have focused on pre-emptive hierarchies, where con£ict arises with resp ect to resource allocation between present and future o¡spring.
INTRODUCTION
Models of sibling competition address how a set of sibsö or rather the genes expressed in a set of sibsödivide something of value (such as resources or parental investment) between themselves. These models can be grouped into two broad classes: (i) models of pre-emptive hierarchies, and (ii) models of scramble competition (Mock & Parker 1997) . The distinction can be illustrated by an analogy in which the resource to be divided is represented by a milkshake (Haig 1992) . In hierarchy models, a queue of o¡spring wait in line to suck on a single straw. The more milk that is taken by the individual at the head of the queue, the less that is available for other o¡spring who are yet to take their turn. Such models apply to situations in which o¡spring are produced sequentiallyö an o¡spring yet to be conceived can do little to limit the resources consumed by an older siböbut also to competition within litters, if the most dominant sib is free to choose how much she takes, the next most dominant is free to choose how much of the remainder he takes, and so on. By contrast, in models of scramble competition, each o¡spring has its own straw and all suck at once. Such models apply to competition within litters when stronger o¡spring are unable to exclude weaker o¡spring from access to a resource.
The crucial di¡erence between the two types of model is who bears the cost of increased consumption. If the queue of o¡spring in a single-straw model contains a random mixture of greedy and abstemious genotypes, members of both classes will su¡er when the milkshake runs dry, whereas, if some o¡spring suck harder than others in a multi-straw model, the o¡spring with higher sucking rates increase their intake at the expense of the poor suckers (Haig 1992) . Roughly speaking, sibling greed is limited by relatedness in single-straw models, but not in multi-straw models (Metcalf et al. 1979) .
Single-straw models predict the evolution of genomic imprinting (gene expression speci¢c to parent of origin) at loci that in£uence an o¡spring's consumption of maternal resources if an allele's e¡ects when maternally derived are evolutionarily separable from its e¡ects when paternally derived (Haig 1992; Mochizuki et al. 1996) . That is, whenever mothers have o¡spring by more than one father, two randomly chosen sibs will be more likely to share alleles inherited from their mother than alleles inherited from their father(s). Therefore, the inclusive¢tness cost of reduced maternal investment in future o¡spring will be greater for an o¡spring's maternally derived alleles than for its paternally derived alleles, and alleles of paternal origin will be selected to take a larger share of maternal investment than will alleles of maternal origin.
At ¢rst sight, multi-straw models seem inimical to the evolution of genomic imprinting. Any newly arisen allele that increases an o¡spring's demand is seemingly favoured by natural selection, regardless of the allele's parental origin, because litter-mates with the allele take resources from those without the allele. Conversely, any allele that reduces an o¡spring's demand, either by producing less of a demand enhancer or more of a demand inhibitor, is disadvantaged when rare because restraint by o¡spring with the allele merely frees resources for sibs without the allele. For this reason, multi-straw models predict an in¢nite escalation of demand if increased solicitation is without cost. However, unbounded escalation of demand is prevented if costs of solicitation are included in the models (MacNair & Parker 1979) . Such costs create an opportunity for natural selection to act di¡erently on alleles of maternal and paternal origin.
The model presented below (½ 2) shows that paternally derived alleles will be selected to produce more of a demand factor than maternally derived alleles, if increased demand reduces the amount of resources to be divided between a set of sibs but increases the share of the diminished pool received by o¡spring that are more demanding. Conversely, a maternally derived allele that reduces an o¡spring's level of demand, relative to litter-mates without the allele, can be favoured by natural selection if the reduction in demand causes all o¡spring (including those with reduced demand) to be better o¡.
A MULTI-STRAW MODEL OF SIBLING COMPETITION
An evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS) occurs at a locus when the strategy employed by most alleles in the population cannot be displaced by any alternative strategy that is initially rare (Maynard Smith & Price 1973) . Our model will consider two loci: A, encoding a demand factor, and B, encoding a demand-factor antagonist. Two alleles will be considered at each locus: an established allele possessed in homozygous form by most individuals in the population, and a rare allele possessed by a few heterozygous individuals. The established allele's strategy will constitute an ESS if all rare alternative strategies are associated with lower ¢tness. For the purposes of investigating genomic imprinting, each allele's strategy will be represented by a two-element vector, the ¢rst element of which represents the allele's level of expression when maternally derived and the second element its level of expression when paternally derived. We shall assume that the value of the ¢rst element is evolutionarily unconstrained by the value of the second element (and vice versa).
At the demand-factor locus, the established allele A 1 has strategy fx m 1 , x p 1 g and the rare allele A 2 has strategy fx m 2 , x p 2 g. When A 2 is rare, A 2 A 2 genotypes are very rare, and will be ignored. A 1 A 1 , A 2 A 1 , A 1 A 2 o¡spring (maternally derived alleles listed ¢rst) produce amounts X 1 , X m , X p , where the subscripted dot is used here, and below, as a dummy that can be replaced in any given equation by either p or m). Speci¢cally,
(2) } For simplicity, the model will consider`average' litters containing a rare allele (rather than summing across all possible litter compositions). An average heterozygous carrier of a rare allele belongs to a litter in which he is one of r°heterozygous sibs producing X°, Y°. The other members of the litter are (n7r°) homozygous sibs producing X 1 , Y 1 (the model assumes n 41 because scramble competition is absent from`litters' of a single o¡spring). All members of the litter are assumed to extract resources from a common p ool of size S°that is a decreasing function of Z°, the level of demand of each of the heterozygous o¡spring:
Thus, increased production of the demand factor increases an o¡spring's fractional share of maternal resources but decreases the total amount of resources available to its litter, whereas increased production of the antagonist has opposite e¡ects. Production of the demand factor confers an individual bene¢t but a shared cost, whereas production of the antagonist confers a shared bene¢t but an individual cost.
In the language of trait-group selection (Wilson 1977) , r m /n is the`average subjective frequency' of heterozygotes who inherit the rare allele from their mother, whereas r p /n is the corresponding frequency for heterozygotes who inherit the rare allele from their father. If all litters are sired by a single male, r pˆrmˆ1 2 (n + 1), otherwise r p 5 r mˆ1 2 (n + 1).
An o¡spring's fractional share of S°is assumed to be the ratio of its own level of demand to the aggregate demand of the litter. Thus, the amount of resources acquired by heterozygous o¡spring considered as a group (R°) is given by
Finally, we shall assume that a heterozygous o¡spring's ¢tness is a monotonically increasing function of R°. Maxima of ¢tness will therefore occur when R°is maximized.
Before presenting a formal analysis of ESS conditions, it is worth discussing two qualitative aspects of the model. First, the size of the pool of resources, S, is maximal when the demand function, Z, is zero for all o¡spring. Z is therefore a measure of the ine¤ciencies that arise from sibling rivalry. Second, in a model of pure scramble competition, such as this, a rare allele can increase in frequency only if it increases the amount of resources, R, obtained by heterozygous o¡spring. This condition applies to both the demand factor and its antagonist. An allele B 2 that increases production of the antagonist will decrease the fractional share of resources received by heterozygotes. If such an allele is to increase in frequency, this decrease in fractional share must be more than compensated for by an increase in the size of the pool. A similar restriction need not apply in models that include e¡ects on subsequent litters because an increase in inclusive ¢tness is possibleödespite the decrease in individual ¢tnessöif the bene¢t to future siblings is su¤ciently great.
(a) Demand-factor ESS For purposes of describing the ESS at the demandfactor locus, all alleles at the antagonist locus will be assumed to be B 1 . As a result, all o¡spring produce the same amount of antagonist, and an o¡spring's share of resources is proportional to its own level of production of demand factor relative to the aggregate production by its litter. For simplicity, S°(X°) is de¢ned to be the size of the pool of resources for a litter containing (n7r°) members producing X 1 , and r°members producing X°. Therefore, heterozygous o¡spring considered as a group will receive
The best strategic response of A 2 to A 1 will occur at maxima of equation (5). The relevant partial derivatives are 
Subscripts are dropped from S°(X°) and X°because S m (X m )ˆS p (X p ) when X pˆXmˆX1 . The term within the square brackets is larger for equation (7b) than for equation (7a), except when r mˆrp (single paternity). With this one exception, (7a) 5 0 when (7b)ˆ0 and (7b) 4 0 when (7a)ˆ0. Therefore, the maternally derived allele will be silent at an imprinted ESS of the form f0, X * g. This is an expression of the`loudest-voice-prevails' principle (Haig 1996 (Haig ,1997a . Put into words rather than equations, both alleles at a locus contribute their products to a common pool. Whenever the combined level of demand factor is greater than the (lower) maternal optimum, maternally derived alleles would bene¢t from producing less. Conversely, whenever the combined level is less than the (higher) paternal optimum, paternally derived alleles would bene¢t from producing more. Each increase in paternal production can be matched by a decrease in maternal production, until maternal production reaches zero, at which point no further reduction is possible. Paternally derived alleles are then free to produce their favoured amount.
In the case of single paternity, r mˆrpˆ1 2 (n + 1). Therefore, (7a)ˆ(7b)ˆ0 at an ESS.This implies
Condition (8) X * g lies at the midpoint of this continuum. The assumption that an o¡spring's fractional share of resources is proportional to its value of Z relative to the aggregate Z in its litter ensures that X 4 0 at an ESS. The evolutionary instability of a population in which the established allele has strategy f0, 0g can be seen by considering the e¡ect of an initially rare allele that produced an in¢nitesimally small amount¯X. Such an allele would have little e¡ect on the total amount of resources to be divided, but, in mixed litters, all resources would be obtained by o¡spring that produced¯X and none by o¡spring that produced zero. This implication is clearly unrealistic. Nevertheless, our model retains the assumption of pro rata shares for reasons of mathematical tractability, and because similar assumptions have been employed in most previous models of scramble competition within litters (Mock & Parker 1997) .
(b) Antagonist ESS
For purposes of describing the ESS at the antagonist locus, all alleles at the demand-factor locus will be assumed to be A 1 . In this section, S°(Y°) will be de¢ned to be the size of the pool of resources available to a litter containing (n7r°) members producing Y 1 and r°members producing Y°. Therefore, heterozygous o¡spring as a group will receive
The ESS is obtained by evaluating partial derivatives of equation (9) A necessary condition for maternally derived alleles to favour non-zero production of the antagonist is that (10a) 4 0 when evaluated for Yˆ0. That is,
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The left-hand side of this inequality represents the proportional increase in the pool of resources caused by the ¢rst small increment in antagonist. The right-hand side is the corresponding decrease in a B 2 B 1 o¡spring's level of demand multiplied by the o¡spring's average subjective frequency of B 1 B 1 sibs (who produce zero antagonist). For a litter of two, this translates into a requirement that the proportional increase of the pool be greater than a quarter of the o¡spring's decrease in demand. For large litters, condition (11) speci¢es that the proportional increase in the pool must exceed half the decrease in demand.
(c) Competition within and between litters
The model presented above excludes e¡ects on future o¡spring to isolate the theoretical consequences of scramble competition. This limits the kinds of gene action that are favoured by natural selection to those that enhance individual ¢tness. In particular, the model cannot represent gene actions that reduce individual ¢tness for the bene¢t of future o¡spring. For many real organisms, competition within litters can have consequences for future litters, but few models have attempted to combine single-and multi-straw competition, probably because such models are messy and lack simple generalizations.
A model that considers both kinds of interaction has been presented by Haig (1996) . In his model, increased production of a nutrient-enhancing hormone results in increased resources available to a litter at the cost of decreased resources available for future siblings. The multi-straw component of the model is particularly simple because all members of a litter release the hormone into a common pool (the maternal circulation) and all obtain an equal share of the resulting resources (from which each member subtracts her own costs of production).
In this model, multiple paternity within litters had opposite e¡ects to changes of paternity between litters. Production of the hormone by o¡spring was of communal bene¢t within litters, but had an individual cost. Thus, an increase in the number of fathers within litters increased the free-rider problem for paternally derived allelesöbut not for maternally derived allelesöand consequently reduced the level of hormone favoured by paternally derived alleles. (This e¡ect is present in the current model and accounts for the higher level of antagonist favoured by maternally derived alleles.) However, increased resources obtained by the current litter occurred at the expense of future litters. As a consequence, increased turnover of fathers between litters caused paternally derived alleles to favour higher levels of hormone production but had no e¡ect on the level favoured by maternally derived alleles. (E¡ects on future o¡spring are absent from the current model.)
The placental-hormone model did not predict imprinted expression of the hormone by maternally derived alleles of o¡spring for any combination of multiple paternity within litters and changes of paternity between litters because it included the possibility that alleles expressed in the mother (as well as in o¡spring) could release hormone into the common pool. As a result, whenever maternally derived alleles of o¡spring favoured greater production than paternally derived alleles, alleles expressed in the mother favoured even higher levels and took over all production. However, if the possibility of production by the mother had been excluded, the model would have predicted imprinted expression of the hormone by either maternally derived or paternally derived alleles, depending on details of the mating system.
The placental-hormone model illustrates some of the complexities of the interaction between competition within and between litters, but is not a general treatment of this problem. Other possibilities that remain to be formally modelled include a demand factor that increases an o¡spring's share at the expense of current and future o¡spring, or a demand-factor antagonist that takes from the current litter to give to future litters.
PUBLIC GOODS AND COLLECTIVE ACTION
The model of scramble competition presented in this paper can be interpreted as an illustration of the economic principle that groups tend to underprovide public goods because a public good (by de¢nition) is available to all, whether or not an individual contributes to its provision (Olson 1961) . From this perspective, the pool of resources shared by the members of a litter is a public good that is underprovided at evolutionary equilibrium. The size of the pool would be larger, and each sib would receive more, if all sibs demanded less, but unilateral restraint by a subset of sibs would reduce their own share for the bene¢t of sibs who do not show restraint. Such ine¤ciencies are a general feature of models of sib competition.
In contrast with models in which genes expressed in o¡spring determine the distribution of a collective good among sibs, e¤cient outcomes are predicted if genes expressed in a shared parent determine the distribution of the good. This is because the e¡ect on o¡spring of an allele expressed in a parent is (usually) independent of whether the o¡spring inherits the allele. That is, if genes in parents are uninformed about which o¡spring inherit which alleles, the best they can do is to maximize the combined ¢tness of o¡spring considered as a group (cf. Harsanyi 1953) . The extra information available to genes in o¡springöthat an allele is de¢nitely present in the o¡spring in which it is expressed öprevents these genes from achieving an e¤cient outcome. It is not always better to be better informed.
In The logic of collective action, Olson (1961) argued that the larger a group, the greater the shortfall from optimal provision of public goods, other things being equal. If the analogy between sib competition and economic models is to be extended, one must ask who or what in the multistraw model takes the place of the rational self-interested individual of economics. The unit of strategic innovation in our model is not an individual siböor even an individual copy of a gene within a siböbut rather an`allele', in the collective sense of all identical-by-descent copies of a DNA sequence within a litter (compare the discussion of the`strategic gene' in Haig (1997b) ). By this de¢nition, the expected number of maternally derived alleles in a litter (two) is smaller than the expected number of paternally derived alleles (more than two if there is some possibility of multiple paternity). That is, maternally derived alleles comprise a smaller group than paternally derived alleles and are therefore predicted to contribute more to the provision of public goods. Conversely, paternally derived alleles are predicted to invest more in the acquisition of sel¢sh bene¢ts that reduce the supply of public goods.
Multiple paternity within litters is not the only reason why alleles of di¡erent parental origin might interact in groups of di¡erent sizes. For example, consider a species that forms social groups of matrilineal female kin whose reproduction is monopolized (temporarily) by each of a series of unrelated males. O¡spring born during the reproductive tenure of any given male would typically possess fewer paternally derived alleles than maternally derived alleles, esp ecially at X-linked loci. If so, one might expect the expression of alleles of paternal origin to favour greater cooperation between individuals of similar age than would the expression of alleles of maternal origin (Trivers & Burt 1999; Haig 2000) . Robert Trivers and two anonymous referees have commented helpfully on the manuscript.
